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I.

INTRODUCTION

Simply stated, personal jurisdiction represents a court’s power
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1

to bind parties to a judicial action. However, during the last
century, the conflicts and laws that have emerged across the United
2
States to regulate personal jurisdiction are far from simple.
Particularly, the rationale for “hauling” foreign defendants into
court has grown increasingly more complex due to advancing
3
technology and expanding global markets. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has tried to provide answers, from the “minimum
contacts” analysis to varying “stream of commerce” theories,
4
personal jurisdiction remains a murky area for interpretation.
Minnesota has not escaped the confusion that surrounds
5
personal jurisdiction. In fact, in Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics
6
Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court was forced to analyze
personal jurisdiction in light of the infamous U.S. Supreme Court
plurality opinion Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
7
California. Asahi has placed a gray cloud over personal jurisdiction
by articulating, but with divided support, a much stricter standard
for defining “minimum contacts” and the “stream of commerce”
8
theory in products liability cases. Nonetheless, Juelich manages to
offer some clarity for Minnesota law by providing its own
interpretation of Asahi, revisiting its position on the “stream of
commerce” theory, and subsequently reaffirming its five-factor test
9
for personal jurisdiction. Even though it neglects to elaborate on
a broader issue of foreign-national defendants, the case is of
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (8th ed. 2004).
2. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 666
(3d ed. 2000) (noting that “jurisdiction has continued to plague lawyers, judges
and law students” in describing the evolution of personal jurisdiction law).
3. See Kristin R. Baker, Comment Products Liability Suits and the Stream of
Commerce After Asahi: World-Wide Volkswagen is Still the Answer, 35 TULSA L.J. 705,
708-13 (2000) (discussing growth in the international economy and the
development of the “stream of commerce” theory of minimum contacts).
4. See Scott M. Hagel, Case Note, Civil Procedure—The Stream of Commerce
Theory in Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit? In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, 24 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 231, 231-39 (1998) (criticizing the development of “minimum
contacts” and “stream of commerce” theories in the United States).
5. Id. at 241-44.
6. 682 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2004).
7. Id. at 567-68 (citing significant similarities to Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
8. Baker, supra note 3, at 705 (“Asahi further confused the issue because the
Court split . . . over the amount of contact required in the stream of commerce
analysis.”); see also Hagel, supra note 4, at 237 (“Rather than clarifying the area, a
divided [Asahi] Court could agree only on the result.”).
9. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 568, 571-73.
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significant importance due to its resolution of the “stream of
10
In effect, Juelich rejects
commerce” application in Minnesota.
Asahi’s stricter standard for placing products into the “stream of
commerce” and suggests that either direct or indirect contacts with
11
a forum may be sufficient for personal jurisdiction.
First, this Case Note explores the development of personal
jurisdiction theory in the United States and how it has shaped
12
13
current Minnesota law. Then, it investigates the facts of Juelich
and analyzes the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision considering
14
the legacy of Asahi.
Finally, it concludes that the Juelich court
rightly rejects Asahi’s stringent “stream of commerce” analysis and
provides needed clarity to Minnesota’s position, even if it avoids a
15
more general issue concerning foreign-national defendants.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
16

A. The Power Theory: Pennoyer v. Neff

As acknowledged above, the U.S. Supreme Court has spent
more than one hundred years attempting to create guidelines for
17
personal jurisdiction. In fact, the original chief basis for personal
jurisdiction dates back to the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in
18
Pennoyer v. Neff. The Pennoyer Court developed the gold standard
rule: jurisdiction is warranted when a defendant is physically present
19
within a forum state and simultaneously served there with process.
10. Id. at 575.
11. Id. at 571 (“This court has recognized that minimum contacts may be
indirect, under the stream of commerce theory.”).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17. Hagel, supra note 4, at 231 (“Over the last fifty years the United States
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify [personal jurisdiction] standards . . . .”).
See generally Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” for International Shoe (and None for
Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 755 (1995) (discussing the past and potential future of personal jurisdiction).
18. 95 U.S. at 714. As the genesis of personal jurisdiction law, Pennoyer makes
a party’s presence within a forum the primary method for obtaining jurisdiction.
Id. The Court defends its position in Pennoyer by adhering to “universal law.” Id. at
720.
19. Id. at 714 (representing the U.S. Supreme Court’s first significant rule
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Essentially, the holding gave rise to the theory of “territorial
power,” by declaring that every state may claim individual
sovereignty over the persons, corporations, and land located within
20
its boundaries.
Although the immediate Pennoyer rule dealt with establishing
personal jurisdiction over natural persons, similar standards soon
21
evolved for binding corporations. Specifically, a corporation was
bound by traditional notions of personal jurisdiction if it was (1)
incorporated in the forum state; (2) “doing business” there; or (3)
had consented, either expressly or impliedly, to jurisdiction in that
22
Nonetheless, as interstate commerce and business on a
state.

regarding personal jurisdiction and a court’s power to bind parties to an action).
“Service of process” refers to the action by which a complaint and summons, each
in paper form, are delivered together to a named defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
The summons is a piece of paper that represents the power of a court (federal or
state) to bind the parties of the action so identified in the complaint. Id. Thus,
the actual service of a summons represents the power to be bound. Id.
20. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. The Pennoyer Court stated, “[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which
it is established.” Id. Pennoyer’s notion of state sovereignty has further developed
into the basis of transient jurisdiction, a court’s ability to obtain jurisdiction by
serving a defendant when he or she is temporarily physically present in a state.
MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 674 (discussing Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), in which a court found personal jurisdiction over a
defendant who was served with process while flying on a passenger airplane over
the forum State of Arkansas). Subsequently, legal authorities have challenged the
constitutional soundness of transient jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 202-03 (1977). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, albeit in a plurality opinion
of questionable precedential value, has continued to uphold its practice. See
generally Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality
opinion).
21. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86 (“[T]here developed a doctrine
of corporate ‘presence’—a corporation was present where it engaged in a
sufficient amount of activities, and it could therefore be . . . ‘doing business.’”).
Rules for measuring personal jurisdiction can be distinguished between binding
natural persons versus corporations. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714. The criteria for
power over natural persons, primarily derived from Pennoyer, are (1) defendant is
served with process while physically present in the forum; (2) defendant is
domiciled in the forum; or (3) defendant gives consent, either expressly or
impliedly. Id. at 714, 723, 735. Compare Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916)
(defining express consent), with Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (defining
implied consent). For the recognized definition of what constitutes a “domicile”
in jurisdictional issues, see also Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. Standards of incorporation are based on Pennoyer, while standards of
express and implied consent are based on Kane and Hess, respectively. Hess, 274
U.S. at 356; Kane, 242 U.S. at 167. But in evaluating a “doing business” standard,
see MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86.
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national scale increased, it became more difficult for courts to rely
on traditional principles of personal jurisdiction when binding
23
defendants, especially corporations.
A frustrating legal challenge that soon developed was a
corporation’s ability to easily “be present” in multiple jurisdictions
24
at one time.
As is still the case today, a corporation was not
limited to conducting business in the state of its headquarters but
25
could choose to engage in commerce across state lines. Thus,
determining whether or not a corporation was sufficiently “doing
business” in a forum state to warrant personal jurisdiction under
Pennoyer’s traditional methods began to fuel questions of fairness,
26
as well as constitutionality.
In general, due to pressures of
industrialization and a growing economy, jurisdiction over foreign27
By the
state corporations was becoming increasingly complex.
mid-twentieth century, an additional means for dealing with these
28
issues was urgently needed.
B. Shifting to Minimum Contacts: International Shoe v.
29
Washington
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court moved away from
strict insistence on Pennoyer and revealed a supplemental test based
30
on a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state. The
landmark formula developed by the Court in International Shoe
requires sufficient “minimum contacts” with a forum so that the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a party does not offend

23. In Hanson v. Denckla, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “[a]s technological
progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time,
progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in
a foreign tribunal less burdensome.” 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); see also MARCUS
ET AL., supra note 2, at 685-86 (discussing jurisdiction over corporate defendants).
24. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 232.
25. See id.
26. Id.; see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also infra
note 31 and accompanying text (describing the need to adhere to the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in personal jurisdiction cases).
27. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 232-33.
28. Id.
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. Id. at 316; see also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (“[T]he requirements for
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of
Pennoyer . . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe.”).
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traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice” embodied
31
in the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. With regard
to corporations, the prior “doing business” test for personal
jurisdiction was replaced by a more liberal “minimum contacts”
32
analysis.
Although International Shoe is highly regarded for its
advancement of a Constitutional requirement in personal
jurisdiction, the case is not entirely clear on how to analyze
33
“minimum contacts.”
For instance, the Court seems especially
concerned that the defendant’s contact with the forum state be
34
“continuous and systematic.” Yet, the Court does not define a
process for differentiating such behavior on a case-by-case basis
while keeping in balance with the concepts of “fair play and
35
substantial justice.” Moreover, the decision does not address what
kinds of limits, if any, should be placed on “minimum contacts”
36
when establishing personal jurisdiction.
In effect, International
Shoe creates a broad requirement of “minimum contacts” that lacks

31. As further elaborated by the Court in International Shoe:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment . . . , if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”
326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
32. See id. at 316. Although the facts of International Shoe involve a corporate
defendant, the language used to describe the minimum contacts test also seems
applicable to individuals and has been held to “apply generally to all defendants.”
See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 691-92 n.1.
33. Justice Black, in a harsh dissent in International Shoe, finds that the
majority has not presented a “workable standard” that can be used to analyze
personal jurisdiction situations. 326 U.S. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black states, instead of providing a solid framework, “the Court . . . has engaged in
an unnecessary discussion in the course of which it has announced vague
Constitutional criteria applied for the first time to the issue before us. It has thus
introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern . . . .” Id.
34. Id. at 320 (“Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of
appellant in the State of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were
systematic and continuous . . . .”). Ultimately, International Shoe meshes the
“systematic and continuous” requirement with that of minimum contacts. See id.
35. See id. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting).
36. In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court addresses limits on the “flexible”
jurisdiction requirements expressed in International Shoe. 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958). Hanson enforces the need for minimum contacts to justify personal
jurisdiction but couples this requirement with the need for purposeful availment.
Id. at 253.
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37

directive constraints.
Not surprisingly, the analytical framework that has evolved in
applying this standard is far from straightforward as courts across
the country have grappled with how to interpret “minimum
38
contacts.”
Many state legislatures initially responded to
International Shoe by enacting “long-arm statutes” designating how
39
states could bind foreign defendants. Long-arm statutes, which
still exist today, aim to validate a state’s jurisdictional power over
40
foreign defendants not actually present within a state’s territory.
These laws describe the kinds of cases that merit exercising
41
personal jurisdiction over a foreign party.
Such statutes have tended to vary significantly from state to
42
state, running the spectrum from broad to narrow.
For
consistency, the Supreme Court has placed significant limits on
long-arm statutes, especially in products liability suits, so that an
International Shoe “minimum contacts” analysis is almost always
43
required. Furthermore, by reviewing more personal jurisdiction
37. See id. at 251 (“[I]t is a mistake to assume that [the evolution to
International Shoe’s flexible standard] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”).
38. See Baker, supra note 3, at 713-21 (discussing circuit court responses to
application of “stream of commerce” theories); see also Silberman, supra note 17, at
755 (“Justice Black did warn that the ‘minimum contacts’ test was an unworkable
one, and he certainly was right in predicting that such elastic criteria would leave
judges the ‘supreme arbiters’ of jurisdictional standards.”). In fact, regarding the
difficulties in interpreting personal jurisdiction, one commentator has questioned
whether many lower courts have even bothered to adopt the different theories set
forth by the Supreme Court. Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal
Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (studying approximately 1000 published state
personal jurisdiction cases from 1970 to 1994 and finding that changes in the law
have been rather modest).
39. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 697. Illinois enacted the first long-arm
statute in 1955. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 697, 701 n.2, 703 n.7. For example, California has historically
maintained a very broad statute extending to the limit of the Constitution, while
Illinois has been comparatively more restrictive. Id. at 697.
43. Id. at 704 n.8. Even if a state has a long-arm statute, the ultimate test for
personal jurisdiction should still follow a minimum contacts analysis based on
International Shoe. Id. Language in long-arm statutes will commonly indicate limits
based on the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 703 n.7; see
also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (“The standard for determining
whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with
the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in
International Shoe.”).
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cases in light of International Shoe, the Supreme Court has
developed additional criteria to aid in evaluating “minimum
44
contacts” situations.
C. Refining the Stream of Commerce Theory: World-Wide Volkswagen
45
Corp. v. Woodson
Specifically, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court
applied a “stream of commerce” theory, suggesting that a
manufacturer or distributor might be subject to suit in a forum
state for “directly or indirectly” placing its products into the
46
forum. Notably, “seek[ing] to serve” the market through indirect
contact was deemed acceptable to substantiate personal jurisdiction
47
over a defendant. However, World-Wide Volkswagen also asserted
that a defendant must “purposefully avail[] itself” of the benefits of
the forum state to logically foresee being “haled” into its courts;

44. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 706. During the twenty years following
International Shoe, the Supreme Court was virtually silent on issues of personal
jurisdiction. Id. But, as more cases have since been decided, criteria for personal
jurisdiction and minimum contacts have been refined. Id. Yet, at least one
commentator has found such refinements to be “arbitrary particularizations.” Id.
(citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 241 SUP.
CT. REV. 283 (1965)). Nonetheless, later cases have helped to shape factors
determinative of minimum contacts. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (substantiating the stream of commerce theory
of minimum contacts); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (describing
that there must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws” (emphasis added)); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 220-23 (1957) (finding sufficient minimum contacts through a single
contact with the forum state).
45. 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
46. Id. World-Wide Volkswagen addressed the “stream of commerce” issue on a
national scale after it was initially introduced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
The case involved interpretation of the Illinois long-arm statute, the first of its
kind. See supra note 39. Accordingly, the Gray court held that a tort is committed
wherever the resulting injury or damage occurs. 176 N.E.2d at 762. Specifically,
the court stated, “the place of wrong is where the last event takes place which is
necessary to render the actor liable.” Id. at 762-63. Gray never actually used the
words “stream of commerce” in its opinion but relied on the phrase “in the
ordinary course of commerce.” Id. at 766. Twenty years later, World-Wide
Volkswagen seemed to invalidate Gray’s approach by declaring that foreseeability
alone is not enough to justify minimum contacts. 444 U.S. at 295.
47. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
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48

mere foreseeability alone was held inadequate. The Court also
rejected the idea that factors of reasonableness, such as the level of
inconvenience to a defendant to litigate in a foreign state, could
outweigh the importance of the purposeful availment
49
requirement.
In other words, World-Wide Volkswagen articulated that if a
product finds its way into a state, and subsequently causes injury
there, this is not enough to subject a foreign manufacturer or
50
distributor to personal jurisdiction in that state. Instead, some
effort to promote the product in the forum, albeit through direct or
51
indirect channels, is required. Indeed, personal jurisdiction might
be justified over a manufacturer or distributor that “delivers its
products into the stream of commerce” with a reasonable expectation
52
such products might be purchased in the forum state.

48. Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). WorldWide Volkswagen follows Hanson’s lead in calling for purposeful availment by
suggesting that if a foreign defendant sufficiently enjoys the benefits of a forum
state, it might reasonably foresee being sued in that state. Id.; see also MARCUS ET
AL., supra note 2, at 695 n.4 (discussing Hanson).
In addition, World-Wide
Volkswagen states, “[b]ut the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” 444 U.S.
at 297.
49. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court
states other factors that are insufficient to prevail over the purposeful availment
requirement:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id.
50. Id. at 297-98.
51. Id. at 297. Stated in greater detail by the Court, “if the sale of a product
. . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States . . . .” Id.
52. Id. at 298.
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D. The Power Struggle Continues: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
53
Superior Court of California
Later, in Asahi, the Supreme Court went further, although in a
split decision, to articulate a much stricter “stream of commerce”
54
standard. The facts of Asahi dealt with an indemnification suit
55
Ultimately, the
against a Japanese manufacturer in California.
holding of the case was broken into two major opinions, each
56
written by Justice O’Connor.
The first, a plurality opinion,
focused on “minimum contacts,” while the second, a majority
57
opinion, focused on notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”
In the plurality opinion, O’Connor stated that “more” is
required for minimum contacts besides merely placing a product
into the stream of commerce, even if the defendant knew the
58
product could be “swe[pt] . . . into the forum State.” Accordingly,
there must be some action on the part of the defendant to show
59
“an intent or purpose to serve the market.” The opinion then
goes on to list several examples of how a defendant’s activities
could be “purposefully directed” at the forum, including
“designing the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State . . . or marketing the product
60
through a distributor . . . in the forum State.” Although Asahi’s
minimum contacts analysis expressed a stricter standard than
International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen, its authority is notably
61
limited as a plurality opinion.
In deciding the second issue, however, a majority of the
justices agreed that exercising jurisdiction in California would
62
“offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Balancing factors of reasonableness, the Court placed considerable

53. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
54. Id. at 103-04, 108-13 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 106-08.
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id. at 102-04.
58. Id. at 112 (“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State.”).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id. at 104-05, 113-16 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
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emphasis on the burden of the defendant to defend in the forum
63
state. Moreover, the Court seemed to attach specific relevance to
64
the fact that the defendant was an international corporation.
Even so, Asahi is vague as to whether or not it is merely stipulating
as a general proposition a greater concern for foreign-national
65
defendants. As such, the degree of importance, if any, that should
be placed on the existence of a foreign-national defendant in a
66
personal jurisdiction situation remains uncertain.
In many ways, Asahi has done nothing but confuse personal
jurisdiction matters even further with its split decision on the
67
“stream of commerce” theory. And, to a lesser extent, the case
also falls short by neglecting to address the issue of foreign-national
68
defendants with any real conviction. Not surprisingly, Asahi has
69
confounded many state courts, including those in Minnesota.
E. Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota
Minnesota has a long-arm statute that permits personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants in compliance with federal
70
Due Process, or the standards of International Shoe. Indeed, the
statute states in broad terms that personal jurisdiction in Minnesota
applies to “foreign corporation[s] or any . . . nonresident
71
individual[s] . . . transact[ing] any business within the state.”
Even though the statute does not specifically insist that its
requirements extend to the federal Constitution, case law has
supported this determination since the statute’s inception in
63. Id. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend
oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders.”).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id; see also Baker, supra note 3, at 705 (stating that “Asahi did not help
to clarify” stream of commerce standards).
68. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
69. See Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 572-73
(Minn. 2004); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 712 (“The circuit courts use varied
approaches in applying the stream of commerce analysis in products liability cases
that involve a nonresident defendant.”); Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-43 (discussing
Minnesota methodologies).
70. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570; Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495
N.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Minn. 1992).
71. MINN. STAT. § 543.19 subd. 1(b) (2002).
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72

1967.
Thus, Minnesota’s long-arm statute is satisfied if the
Constitutional requirements of personal jurisdiction from
73
International Shoe are met.
Consequently, Minnesota has been challenged to develop its
own process for analyzing personal jurisdiction in accordance with
74
the principles of International Shoe.
In 1976, the Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Hardrives,
75
Inc. v. City of Lacrosse, which provides the following five-factor test
for evaluating personal jurisdiction situations: (1) quantity of
contacts, (2) quality of contacts, (3) connection between contacts
and cause of action, (4) the state’s interest in providing a forum,
76
and (5) the convenience of the parties.
Similar to the Eighth
Circuit’s interpretation, Minnesota has also expressed that the first
three factors, which deal with minimum contacts, have greater
authority over the last two factors, which deal with fair play and
77
substantial justice.
While analyzing personal jurisdiction cases, Minnesota has also
78
encountered its own share of “stream of commerce” situations.
Notably, in Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., decided two years before Asahi
and relying on World-Wide Volkswagen, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction over a New Jersey manufacturer whose
79
product injured a Minnesota resident. To reach its conclusion,
72. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 48:53 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d ed.
Supp. 2006) (citing Minnesota’s long-arm statute in support of the notion that
“[s]ome courts . . . only consider whether the extension of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, as the result of holdings that the state’s long-arm
statutes reach as far as due process will allow”).
73. See Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570 (“Minnesota’s long-arm statute . . . permits
Minnesota courts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent
of federal due process.” (citing Valspar Corp., 495 N.W.2d at 410)).
74. See Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-43.
75. 240 N.W.2d 814, 307 Minn. 290 (1976).
76. Id. at 817, 307 Minn. at 294 (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d
187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965)).
77. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1985) (citing
Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.
1983)). However, the notion that the first three factors are more significant than
the latter two factors was also initially adopted from the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in Aftanase. 343 F.2d at 197.
78. See, e.g., Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 571 (citing Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722); In re
Minn. Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996); Welsh v. Takekawa Iron
Works Co., 529 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
79. See Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722. The New Jersey defendant was the
manufacturer of metal weights used in the common production of baseball bats.
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the court applied its five-factor test and found that personal
80
The court’s analysis placed
jurisdiction was warranted.
considerable importance on the first requirement, or “quantity of
contacts,” finding the defendant’s indirect contacts through the
stream of commerce enough to maintain jurisdiction and withstand
World-Wide Volkswagen’s necessary showing of purposeful
81
availment. The defendant’s lack of direct contacts with Minnesota
82
did not significantly matter.
The Rostad court went on to evaluate the remaining four
83
factors in support of jurisdiction over the New Jersey defendant.
In particular, the court acknowledged that it had afforded less
weight in its application of the last two requirements, dealing with
fair play and substantial justice, compared to the first three
84
requirements, dealing with minimum contacts. In general, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Rostad followed World-Wide
Volkswagen’s “stream of commerce” approach and held that the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of “the benefits of doing
85
business in Minnesota.”

Id. at 718. One of these weights flew off a bat during a Minnesota softball game,
injuring the plaintiff umpire and ultimately leading to a products liability claim.
Id.
80. Id. at 719-20.
81. Id. The defendant’s distribution contracts and marketing endeavors were
found to be deliberate efforts worthy of establishing a national market for metal
bat-weights, which included Minnesota. Id.
82. Id. at 720-21.
83. Id. at 721-22. Second, in evaluating the nature and “quality of the
contacts,” the Rostad court found it especially significant that thousands of bats
containing the defendant’s metal-weights were actually sold within the state. Id. at
722. Furthermore, the company required its trademark, as well as a picture of its
president, to be placed on every package. Id. In so doing, it “thrust its corporate
image into the jurisdiction, both by its own packaging requirements and the
actions of its distributors, and profited.” Id. Third, in analyzing the “connection of
the contacts with the cause of action,” the court saw the relationship as
overwhelmingly satisfied since the defendant had actively sought to create a
national market and should have known it would include Minnesota. Id. Then,
the court turned to the remaining two factors, while affording them lesser
consideration compared to the first three. Id. Under the fourth requirement, the
court found “Minnesota’s interest in litigating” the case “obvious,” since it was the
site of the accident and home of the “severely injured.” Id. Then, in balancing
the fifth consideration, the “convenience of the parties,” it found Minnesota
jurisdiction the fairest under the circumstances, since only the defendant resided
elsewhere. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 720, 722.
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However, in analyzing the stream of commerce approach with
regard to foreign-national defendants, the Minnesota judiciary has
been reluctant to find sufficient minimum contacts, especially
86
through indirect associations. For example, when dealing with a
Japanese manufacturer in a products liability case, Welsh v.
87
Takekawa Iron Works Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals provided
a critical stream of commerce analysis, emphasizing the need for a
88
clear showing of purposeful availment. Indeed, the court seemed
to be moving towards a stricter standard, though citing Asahi only
once, by asserting that a state’s authority might be limited when
89
exercising personal jurisdiction over international defendants.
A year later, the Minnesota Supreme Court took its turn at
deciding the issue of personal jurisdiction over foreign-national
90
defendants with In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation.
Notably, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not authorize
jurisdiction over an Australian defendant by way of indirect
86. See In re Minn. Asbestos Litig., 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996); Welsh v.
Takekawa Iron Works Co., 529 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
87. 529 N.W.2d at 471. Plaintiff Welsh, a Minnesota citizen, had been
“severely injured” while operating a rip-saw at his place of employment. Id. at 472.
The rip-saw first entered the stream of commerce when Japanese defendant,
Takekawa, manufactured and shipped the product to an Arizona distributor. Id.
Subsequently, the rip-saw was sold to a Minnesota dealer and ultimately purchased
by plaintiff’s Minnesota employer. Id.
88. Id. at 474. The court stressed the need for clear indications, more than
just unilateral activities, of efforts to “directly or indirectly” serve the Minnesota
market. Id. Specifically, the Welsh court stated that “[j]urisdiction cannot arise via
the unilateral activity of someone other than the defendant.” Id. (citing Helten v.
Arthur J. Evers Corp., 372 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)). This notion
was earlier stressed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara
Fire Insurance Co., which states, “[a] customer’s unilateral act of bringing the
corporation’s product into the forum state is insufficient to create personal
jurisdiction.” 518 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980)). In addition, the court
emphasized that because the defendant’s contacts with Minnesota were so few and
its corresponding sales in the state so insignificant, the court could not logically
infer purposeful availment. Welsh, 529 N.W.2d at 474-75.
89. Welsh, 529 N.W.2d at 475 (“We must, however, exercise caution in
asserting jurisdiction over alien corporations, recognizing the additional burden
experienced by one forced to defend itself in a foreign system.” (citing Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987))).
90. 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996). The personal injury lawsuit, brought by
187 plaintiffs, alleged that a group of defendants, including both resident
companies and a foreign-national corporation, had caused significant harm by
manufacturing, selling, or distributing asbestos materials for use in Minnesota. Id.
at 244.
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91

contacts. The court characterized the narrow difference from its
decision in Rostad by explaining that foreseeability had existed in
Rostad through indirect contacts since the distributor had
purposely sold the products in Minnesota on behalf of the
92
manufacturer.
Furthermore, In re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation
stressed that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would
93
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Although Minnesota has more recently seemed to call for
stricter standards in establishing minimum contacts through the
stream of commerce theory, it has also been reluctant to assertively
94
As a result, the
base its decisions on guidance from Asahi.
application of personal jurisdiction standards in Minnesota has
95
lacked affirmative direction. In summary, Rostad, Welsh, and In re
Minnesota Asbestos Litigation, as well as other Minnesota predecessor
cases, have fallen short of providing a needed interpretation of
Minnesota’s stream of commerce position after Asahi; that is, until
Juelich.

91. Id. at 244. The Minnesota Supreme Court was unable to find merit in the
plaintiffs’ and court of appeals’ contention that indirect contacts could be inferred
through the international defendant’s sale of raw asbestos materials to another
manufacturer for use in products that were sold to Minnesota dealers. Id. at 24748. In order for the Australian defendant to be on the hook, the supreme court
called for more meaningful contact with the forum state than merely selling raw
material to a manufacturer for use in a finished product; no matter that the
injurious product was ultimately sold into the Minnesota marketplace. Id. at 24647. The manufacturer in this case was not equivalent to defendant’s distributor, so
personal jurisdiction could not be justified through indirect contacts. Id.
92. Id. at 247. “Unlike the defendants in Rostad, the record does not indicate
that [the distributor’s] contacts with Minnesota were on behalf of [the
manufacturer] or with [the manufacturer’s] approval.” Id. However, in
comparison, one commentator has found the analysis of In re Minnesota Asbestos
Litigation rather troubling, concluding that it “furthered the confusion for those
litigating in Minnesota.” Hagel, supra note 4, at 231-32 (arguing that the court did
not adequately explain its reasoning).
93. 552 N.W.2d at 248. Yet, in its analysis, the court never references greater
degrees of unfairness in binding foreign-national defendants, nor does it even cite
Asahi. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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III. THE JUELICH DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
96

In Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., the plaintiff was
injured in Minnesota while repairing a component part of a laser97
cutting machine.
Both the part and the laser-cutting machine
98
were manufactured in Japan. Consequently, the plaintiff brought
products liability and personal injury suits against (1) the
component part manufacturer, Meikikou, and (2) the machine
manufacturer, Yamazaki Mazak Optonics/Mazak Nissho Iwai
99
(YMO/MANI).
In Juelich, the stream of commerce chain began with Meikikou,
a Japanese corporation that manufactured the original component
100
part, a scissor-lift table, at its factory in Japan.
YMO/MANI then
created a laser-cutting device, using Meikikou’s scissor-lift table as a
101
component part.
Subsequently, the laser-cutting machine made
its way into the Midwest when YMO/MANI sold it to a Minnesota
102
supplier, Gladwin Machinery & Supply Company (Gladwin).
Gladwin then sold the machine to plaintiff’s employer, also a
Minnesota company, Aries Precision Sheet Metal Company
103
(Aries).
As a result of the sale to Aries, YMO/MANI’s service
specialist installed the laser-cutting machine at Aries and gave
96. 682 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2004).
97. Id. at 568. In summary, plaintiff was injured in Minnesota while repairing
Meikikou’s product, a scissor-lift table, which had been used to manufacture
Yamazaki Mazak Optonics/Mazak Nissho Iwai’s (YMO/MANI’s) laser-cutting
machine. Id. Meikikou did not sell directly to a Minnesota supplier but placed its
product into the stream of commerce through YMO/MANI. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. For the sake of simplicity, Yamazaki Mazak Optonics and Mazak
Nissho Iwai (YMO/MANI) are treated in this case note as one party. In actuality,
YMO and MANI are two separate, but affiliated, companies. YMO is the Japanese
manufacturer of the laser-cutting device that contained Meikikou’s component
part. Id. at 568. MANI is YMO’s Illinois subsidiary corporation, an international
distributor that sold the laser-cutting device to the United States. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Through its distribution affiliates, Mekikou sold the part to YMO, a
Japanese manufacturer. Id. The laser-cutting device was marketed as a packaged
system, known as the “Super Turbo X510 System.” Id.
102. Id. Evidence provided at the time of the dispute indicated that a total of
122 laser-cutting machines had been sold in the United States, including 17 in
Minnesota. Id.
103. Id.
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plaintiff and another employee specific training in its use.
After plaintiff brought his original action, YMO/MANI
105
responded with a cross-claim against Meikikou.
Meikikou then
moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims and YMO/MANI’s cross-claim
106
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Subsequently, all claims against
107
Meikikou were dismissed by the district court.
The court of
appeals affirmed by relying on Justice O’Connor’s “stream of
108
commerce” analysis in Asahi. Plaintiff went on to settle his claims
109
with YMO/MANI and did not seek further review.
As such, the
only issue left for the Minnesota Supreme Court to evaluate in
Juelich was the motion to dismiss YMO/MANI’s cross-claim for lack
110
of personal jurisdiction.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
1.

A Personal Jurisdiction Platform

Basically, the Juelich opinion is organized into a “guidebook”
111
At the
for analyzing personal jurisdiction cases in Minnesota.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 569.
106. Id.
107. Id. Mekikou’s motion for dismissal, which was granted by the district
court, was primarily based on the affidavit of the company’s Managing Director
and General Manager of Development, Tsutomu Odaguchi. Id. In his deposition,
Odaguchi testified that Meikikou (1) lacks any involvement with the scissor-lift
component parts once they leave the factory; (2) does not sell its scissor-lift tables
directly to the United States; (3) sells the scissor-lift tables only to Japanese
companies, some of which in turn use the parts in products that are sold to the
United States; (4) makes English language warning labels but only produces
Japanese language operating manuals; and (5) would install any necessary parts to
comply with safety standards when YMO alerted it of a product sale (containing a
Meikikou component party) to another country. Id.
108. Id. Furthermore, Juelich states that “[t]he court of appeals concluded that
Asahi ‘clarified the stream of commerce theory,’ quoting from Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion that the ‘placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed toward the forum
State.’” Id. at 569 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
109. Id. at 569.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 565. The opinion opens with an introduction describing the
primary issues, facts and procedural history of the Juelich case. Id. at 568-69. It is
then neatly organized into two parts, including sub-sections, outlining the steps
needed for analyzing Minnesota personal jurisdiction disputes. Id. at 569-75. Part
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outset, the court notes that the major issue, the jurisdictional
validity of YMO/MANI’s cross-claim, is keenly similar to the issue
112
decided in Asahi.
Indeed, the comparison of Juelich to Asahi is
made in the first sentence of the opinion, seeming to set the stage
for an evaluation of Minnesota personal jurisdiction law in
113
juxtaposition with the infamous U.S. Supreme Court decision.
The opening of Juelich goes on to introduce the facts and
procedural background of the case, after which it is split into two
114
parts. In summary, Part I serves to confirm Minnesota’s personal
jurisdiction rules, while Part II applies these rules in light of
115
Juelich.
The Minnesota Supreme Court creates a legal framework for
personal jurisdiction by providing a historical overview of
jurisdictional law, reaffirming Minnesota’s five-factor test modeled
after the Eighth Circuit, confirming Minnesota’s use of the “stream
of commerce” theory with reliance on Rostad, and emphasizing the
importance of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
116
justice.”
The court begins by reviewing standard personal
117
First, it
jurisdiction law, aptly modeled after International Shoe.
references its long-arm statute, which “permits Minnesota courts to
assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent of
118
federal due process.”
Second, it declares that such “[d]ue
process requires that the defendant have ‘certain minimum
contacts’ with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play

I provides an introduction of personal jurisdiction with three sub-headings,
Minnesota’s Five-Factor Test, The Stream of Commerce Theory of Minimum Contacts, and
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice. Id. at 569-73. Part II goes on
to analyze each of the components of the five-factor test as separate sub-headings:
(1) The quantity of contacts with the forum state, (2) The nature and quality of Meikikou’s
contacts, (3) The connection of the cause of action with these contacts, (4) The interest of the
state in providing a forum, and (5) The convenience of the parties. Id. at 573-76. Justice
Anderson’s concurring opinion follows the conclusion of the Juelich majority. Id.
at 576-78.
112. Id. at 567.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
115. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 569, 573.
116. Id. at 569-73.
117. Id. at 570.
118. Id. (citing Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410
(Minn. 1992)).
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119

and substantial justice.’”
To analyze the Constitutional requirements of personal
jurisdiction according to International Shoe, the court firmly
acknowledges its use of the Eighth Circuit’s five-factor test: (1)
quantity of contacts, (2) quality of contacts, (3) connection
between contacts and cause of action, (4) the state’s interest in
120
providing a forum, and (5) the convenience of the parties.
Additionally, the court connects the five-factor test to the standards
of International Shoe by stating that the first three factors measure
minimum contacts, while the last two factors measure
reasonableness according to “traditional notions of fair play and
121
substantial justice.”
It also expresses reliance on the First
Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach to interpreting the “interplay”
122
In essence, the
between minimum contacts and reasonableness.
stronger a plaintiff’s case regarding minimum contacts, the more a
defendant will need to prove regarding the unreasonableness of
123
the situation, and vice versa.
2.

The Stream of Commerce Approach

In determining how to apply the first three factors, the
Minnesota Supreme Court revisits its “stream of commerce” theory
124
First, describing its
of minimum contacts in light of Asahi.
decision in Rostad, the court recognizes the “stream of commerce”
concept utilized by World-Wide Volkswagen, stating that minimum
125
contacts could indeed be “indirect.”
The court goes so far as to
quote its finding in Rostad that “[the manufacturer’s] distribution
contacts and marketing efforts were calculated attempts to create a
national market for [its] product, a market which specifically
126
In addition, the court makes a lengthy
includes Minnesota.”
119. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
120. Id. (citing Hardrives, Inc. v. City of Lacrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 294, 240
N.W.2d 814, 817 (1976)).
121. Id. (citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir.
1994)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 571.
125. Id. (citing Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985)).
Interestingly, Juelich does not reference its decision in In re Minnesota Asbestos
Litigation when citing Rostad, which relied on a more narrow interpretation of
World-Wide Volkswagen’s allowance for indirect contacts. See id.
126. Id. The court notes that “the decision in Rostad relied upon the ‘stream-
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citation to World-Wide Volkswagen’s “stream of commerce” analysis,
127
emphasizing the importance of “purposeful availment.”
Again, the opinion compares Juelich to Asahi, noting their
128
“strikingly similar” factual situations.
But due to the uncertainty
of a plurality opinion, the court specifically declines to use Asahi’s
stricter test for determining minimum contacts, stating, “[b]ecause
the Asahi Court failed to reach a majority . . . it was error for the
court of appeals to rely on Justice O’Connor’s ‘something more’
129
approach in this case.”
Nonetheless, the Juelich court is sure to
acknowledge that a majority of the Justices in Asahi agreed that
exercising personal jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant would
130
“offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Furthermore, the court notes its own concern with placing burdens
131
on international defendants.
3.

A Closer Look at the Five-Factor Approach

The court finds its five-factor test to be the soundest approach
132
It reasons that
for analyzing personal jurisdiction in Minnesota.
the first three factors, “which trace their roots to the landmark
decision of International Shoe and its progeny,” continue to provide
133
the proper analysis for minimum contacts. The court recognizes
minimum contacts through indirect activity if compliance with
purposeful availment is met but rejects Asahi’s stricter “something
134
more” requirement.
Yet, in recognition of the Justices’
agreement in Asahi, the court reasons that factors four and five are
sufficient for weighing “fair play and substantial justice” and are

of-commerce theory’ enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.” Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court notes that both Asahi and Juelich specifically dealt with
indemnification suits between foreign-national defendants. Id. The court also
notes the timing in comparison to Minnesota’s analysis of stream of commerce
situations, since Asahi was decided two years after Rostad. Id.
129. Id. at 572.
130. Id. at 573 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
131. Id. at 576.
132. Id. at 573. The court notes that “[t]o determine whether Meikikou is
subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota, [it] will apply the five-factor test.”
Id.
133. Id. at 572.
134. Id.
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135

consistent with ensuring Constitutional Due Process.
The court goes on to analyze potential jurisdiction over
136
Meikikou in Minnesota by each of the five factors.
In its
investigation of the first three factors, the court does not find
137
sufficient minimum contacts between Meikikou and Minnesota.
First, the court considers the “quantity of contacts” insignificant,
since Meikikou’s interactions with Minnesota are far less than those
138
at issue in both Rostad and Asahi.
Second, in measuring the
“quality of contacts,” the court is unable to support purposeful
availment, as Meikikou lacks any real “influence” or “control” over
139
the distribution of the laser-cutting machine in Minnesota.
Third, given the shortage of purposeful availment and the “mere
unilateral activity” of numerous suppliers in distributing Meikikou’s
product, a proper “connection between the contacts and the cause
140
of action” does not exist.
In addition, in balancing factors four and five, the court also
holds that the demands on Meikikou in asserting jurisdiction are
141
remarkably unjust under the circumstances.
For example, when
assessing factor four, “the state’s interest in providing a forum,” the
court finds the situation “virtually identical to that in Asahi” and
cannot gather any logical reason as to why a suit of indemnification
between two Japanese companies should be litigated in
142
Then, in looking at factor five, “convenience of the
Minnesota.
parties,” the court holds that the burdens to Meikikou to defend
itself in a foreign country far outweigh any remaining interest

135. Id. at 572-73.
136. Id. at 573-76.
137. Id. at 573-74.
138. Id. The fact that there were seventeen Meikikou component parts located
in Minnesota and a total of 122 located in the United States was not enough to
satisfy the “quantity of contacts” requirement. Id.
139. Id. at 574. The opinion states that Meikikou “took no initiative in
developing a United States market . . . [and] its actions fall short of the affirmative
efforts to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in the United
States, as required by World-Wide Volkswagen.” Id. At particular issue is the
existence and use of Meikikou’s website to promote its component part. Id.
However, the court determined that the website was “passive” and not in support
of jurisdiction. Id.; see also MARCUS ET AL., supra note 2, at 756-59 (describing
recent developments in minimum contacts and the Internet).
140. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 575.
141. Id. at 575-76.
142. Id. at 575.
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143

Minnesota has in controlling the cross-claim.
In the end, the cross-claim asserted against Meikikou by
144
YMO/MANI does not pass Minnesota’s test.
Yet, the Juelich
decision seems to do more than merely uphold a five-factor
formula. Indeed, it confirms Minnesota’s position in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s most important personal jurisdiction cases,
Asahi in particular, and provides guidance for analyzing stream of
145
commerce situations.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUELICH DECISION
The Juelich case is significant because it provides the Minnesota
legal community with a definitive roadmap for handling personal
jurisdiction disputes. Most importantly, it represents a direct
confrontation and ultimate denial of Asahi’s stricter use of the
146
“stream of commerce” theory. Even though Juelich seems to avoid
an underlying issue of fair play and substantial justice with regard
to foreign-national defendants, it succeeds overall in enhancing
Minnesota personal jurisdiction law.
A. The Stream of Commerce Issue
By the time Juelich reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, it
147
involved only a cross-claim. Nonetheless, the court used the case
as an opportunity to take on Asahi’s infamous “stream of
commerce” theory of minimum contacts. In fact, Juelich rejects the
court of appeals’ use of this stricter standard primarily due to the
148
Justices’ inability to provide a majority opinion in Asahi.
By
making a sound statement against the use of Asahi’s stream of
commerce theory, the supreme court ended pre-existing confusion
149
in Minnesota regarding the issue.
In addition, Juelich leaves the
143. Id. at 576. The court notes that “[g]iven that the transaction on which
the indemnification claim is based took place in Japan and Meikikou delivered the
lift table in Japan, YMO/MANI have ‘not demonstrated that it is more convenient
to litigate its indemnification claim’ in Japan.” Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 570-73.
146. Id. at 572.
147. Id. at 569.
148. Id. at 572.
149. See supra Part II.E.; see also Hagel, supra note 4, at 241-42 (discussing
Minnesota’s struggles with personal jurisdiction).
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door open for “indirect” minimum contacts by reaffirming its prior
decision in Rostad, which had relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
150
findings in World-Wide Volkswagen. For example, when describing
Asahi’s stricter approach in detail, the supreme court notably
referred to Justice Brennan’s concurrence, which had revisited
World-Wide Volkswagen’s acceptance of either “direct or indirect”
151
contacts.
B. The Fair Play and Substantial Justice Issue
On the other hand, the court was quick to utilize Asahi’s
majority findings on “fair play and substantial justice” in analyzing
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, especially between
152
In comparison, the court stated,
two international companies.
“like Asahi, it is ‘not at all clear at this point’ that Minnesota law
should govern the question of whether a Japanese corporation
153
should indemnify another Japanese corporation.”
Indeed, the
court never wavered in its findings of significant unfairness to
154
Meikikou, an international component part manufacturer. Thus,
like the Court in Asahi, the Minnesota Supreme Court was also
reluctant to extend the principle of personal jurisdiction to
international,
third-party
component
manufacturers
in
155
indemnification suits.
Although the court might hint that the
state’s interest could be different if the plaintiff were still seeking
jurisdiction over Meikikou, given the procedural posture of the
case, it was not required to analyze this potential situation, nor did
156
it choose to do so.
As such, the “strikingly similar” factual
situations of Juelich and Asahi seem to work against defining a
clearer picture for Minnesota regarding the growing issue of
157
foreign-national defendants.
Indeed, the narrow, factual
resemblance of the two cases allowed the Minnesota Supreme
Court to neglect a broader issue of jurisdiction over international
150. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 571.
151. Id. at 572.
152. Id. at 575-76.
153. Id. at 575.
154. Id. at 576.
155. Id. at 575.
156. Id. The court finds that even if plaintiff were still a party to the case, the
unfairness in bringing Meikikou into court would still outweigh the state’s interest
in allowing the cross-claim to proceed. Id.
157. Id. at 571.
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158

parties.
Thereby, the Minnesota Supreme Court left certain
questions unanswered, including: What if the case is not a crossclaim but a legitimate claim between a Minnesota citizen and an
international defendant? How should Minnesota courts interpret
the stream of commerce theory under such hypothetical
circumstances? Unfortunately, Juelich does not specifically address
these lingering propositions.
C. Asahi Criticism?
Even though Juelich states how to deal with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s indecisiveness, it does not directly challenge the analysis of
Asahi. In fact, it avoids the notion of whether or not the five-factor
scale should tip back the other way, with unfairness taking
precedence over minimum contacts when evaluating jurisdiction
159
over foreign-national parties. Interestingly, in Juelich, Justice Paul
H. Anderson’s concurring opinion seems to shed more light on
some of Asahi’s problems, especially regarding foreign-national
defendants, by finding sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
160
as well as substantial unfairness to the defendant.
Although Justice Anderson’s concurring opinion agrees with
the majority findings regarding factors four and five, it sides with
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi, which states that the suit
represented “one of those rare cases in which minimum
requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial
161
justice’ . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction.”
Thus,
Justice Anderson did not find it necessary to even approach the
minimum contacts analysis in such a situation, as unfairness should
162
take precedence over minimum contacts.
Yet, in comparing the majority’s analysis to his own
examination of the first three factors and also analogizing to
Rostad, Justice Anderson found sufficient evidence of minimum
163
contacts.
One notable fact in his reasoning was that Meikikou
had actually purchased an insurance policy to cover U.S. products158. Id. at 575.
159. See id. at 577 (Anderson, Paul, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 576-78.
161. Id. at 576 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
162. Id. at 577.
163. Id. at 577-78.
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164

liability claims.
Justice Anderson further emphasized “that the
165
trend toward globalized business must factor into our analysis.”
In summary, the concurring opinion delves deeper into the
legacy of Asahi by attempting to interpret its effect on current
166
developments in economics and global business.
Certainly, the
concurrence makes a valid point, given that Minnesota maintains a
healthy business environment with nineteen Fortune 500
companies and a strong medium-sized business base that includes
167
relevant interaction with international companies. It can also be
logically assumed that Minnesota commerce and dealings with
foreign-national corporations will continue to grow in frequency
168
and substance.
As such, a clearer understanding of how to
handle disputes between Minnesota citizens and international
parties from the Juelich majority might have been welcomed by both
the Minnesota business and legal communities.
V. CONCLUSION
Even though Juelich represents an analysis of a cross-claim, its
resulting opinion is quite significant, providing a comprehensive
overview of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction position. Without a
doubt, confusing U.S. Supreme Court opinions such as Asahi have
made it difficult for analyzing theories of minimum contacts with
regard to foreign defendants, especially when it comes to the
169
“stream of commerce” theory.
But despite these complexities in
the current state of the law, the holding of Juelich manages to give
Minnesota a platform for dealing with personal jurisdiction.
Although it falls short of providing greater insight into global
economic trends, its overall outcome is undeniably important,
particularly with regard to applying the stream of commerce
analysis to corporations.
As Minnesota’s first real interpretation of Asahi, Juelich rightly
164. Id. at 577.
165. Id. at 578.
166. Id. at 577-78.
167. Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Business Trends, http://www.deed.state.mn.us/facts/businesstrends.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2006).
168. See Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Global Competitiveness, http://www.deed.state.mn.us/facts/global.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2006).
169. See supra Part II.B.-D.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 6
07BARTSH.DOC

1434

5/31/2006 1:12:31 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

rejects a stricter “stream of commerce” standard and suggests that
indirect contacts might warrant jurisdiction under reasonable
170
circumstances.
Juelich also reaffirms Minnesota’s five-factor test,
giving structure to Minnesota personal jurisdiction law. Indeed, its
analysis of minimum contacts clearly demonstrates that applying
171
“stream of commerce” theories is no simple task.
But, thanks to
Juelich, Minnesota is no longer left to the uncertainty of swimming
up the “stream of commerce.” At least until the next major
evolvement in the law, Minnesota has a sound methodology for
interpretation of its personal jurisdiction cases.

170. See supra Part IV.A.
171. See Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 565. The different results of the majority and
concurring opinions in interpreting minimum contacts reveals significant
potential for variance, even when analyzing the same fact situation under the same
“stream of commerce” theory. Id.
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